What did the 44-day phase of active military operations show and what lessons should Armenia learn?

Political scientist Ara Poghosyan writes:"What lessons did Azerbaijan learn after the pre-war reconnaissance battles of 2016?"

It is not possible to achieve success with the Armenian army with infantry troops. In defensive battles, the infantry troops of the enemy engaged in direct combat with the Armenian army were mostly defeated and retreated.

Artillery fire was generally not effective, because the Armenian artillery troops were able to deliver artillery point hits to the enemy very quickly.

Therefore, there was only one possible way of success for the enemy: aviation. However, in order to use aviation and achieve success, it was necessary to create such a harmonized system of headquarters management, in which case aviation superiority would be expressed in practical success on the ground.

Here, the enemy tried to use UAV systems, which were essentially a novelty for the Armenian army, the Armenian army was not adapted to modern means of warfare, especially the fight against UAV means.

Azerbaijan alone was powerless to develop a unified and organic management system of the troops, for which it received Israeli and Turkish technological support at the same time, with which this issue was also resolved.

The 44-day phase of active military operations in 2020 showed that the Azerbaijani ground forces were largely powerless without the active use of UAVs and a "unified and organic system of troop management". The areas where the Armenian Armed Forces were able to engage the enemy in direct military operations, mostly the enemy suffered heavy losses, in the areas where the enemy did not engage in direct military operations (by direct I mean direct combat operations between ground troops), it was able to occupy the Armenian the regions already freed from the forces, and the losses of the Armenian side in these regions were mainly due to disorganized retreats.

Perhaps the assumption here is that the theses about the defeat of the Armenian army are mainly in the propaganda dimension, which directly affect the army's fighting ability. In fact, it should be honestly said that the Armenian forces did not defeat the enemy, but they did not lose. It is another matter that the entire Armenian military logistics system, the headquarters management system, the army-military-political leadership communication system, the technological preparation, the issuing of orders, their execution and orders were defeated. the process of monitoring the progress of execution.

I am sure that the Armenian Army could and can create a victory, and for that we must honestly analyze the events of 2020, the events of 2021, 2022, 2023 and the entire cycle of the enemy's military procurement and preparation as a whole, and make the necessary real conclusions. on the ground."